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Whitaker v. Lane, 104 S. E. 252, 19 MICH. L. REV. 343. For full note on the subject by Professor Ballantine, see 3 ILL. LAW BULL. 3, 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL 826.

DIVORCE—SPECIFIC PORTION OF HUSBAND'S ESTATE CANNOT ORDINARILY BE AWARDED AS ALIMONY.—In a divorce proceeding the wife had been granted \$30 per month alimony; on appeal, she asked that this portion of the decree be reversed and that she be allowed to remain in the home of the husband, which consisted of a house and twenty-four acres of land and was his sole real estate. *Held*, a wife is not entitled to have any specific parcel of real estate assigned as her own. Alimony is usually an allowance of money out of the husband's estate, but not the estate itself. *Lovegrove v. Lovegrove* (Va., 1920), 104 S. E. 804.

Permanent alimony after the dissolution of the marriage status is wholly a creation of the written law. It was not known to the common or ecclesiastical law. *Bacon v. Bacon*, 43 Wis. 197; *Brenger v. Brenger*, 142 Wis. 26, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 387. However, in construing the statutes the courts have from the first been influenced by the English practice, under which the courts gave the wife an allowance only, and such a thing as partition of estate was unknown. *Bacon v. Bacon*, *supra*. In many states such an allowance is expressly provided for by statute. 19 C. J. 260. Such a statute in Ohio, providing that "the court shall allow such alimony out of the husband's property as it deems reasonable, etc.," raised a doubt as to whether this effort to enlarge the power of the court had not in fact resulted in cutting its authority down so that it could give *only* specific property as alimony. A discussion of *Lape v. Lape*, 124 N. E. 51, which involves this particular statute, is found in 18 MICH. L. REV. 60. See also 18 MICH. L. REV. 799, for a discussion of a Kansas case, *Nixon v. Nixon*, 188 Pac. 227, which involves a similar statute. In the absence of such statutes, the holding of the principal case is without doubt the majority rule; although there is a conflict of authority. This rule is based on the proposition that the claim of the wife for alimony is a personal claim on the husband. *Almond v. Almond*, 4 Rand. (25 Va.) 668, 15 Am. Dec. 781. Therefore, it comes under the general principle that chancery courts have no inherent power to declare liens against real estate to secure debts which may be established against the person. *Perkins v. Perkins*, 16 Mich. 162. There are cases which, although they recognize as law the rule of the principal case, do set aside specific property for the wife out of regard for the special equities of a particular case. Instances of this arise where the property has been purchased with the wife's money or has been acquired largely or wholly as a result of her earnings, industry, or frugality. *Mussing v. Mussing*, 104 Ill. 126. This, however, is a different case from one in which provision for her support is made solely on the grounds that a man is in duty bound to support his wife—that is, where the property is granted to her as a result of her status as wife. *Champion v. Myers*, 207 Ill. 308, 310.